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Expert Evidence in the Republic of Korea
and Under the U.S. Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Comparative Study
ERIC ILHYUNG LEE*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1987, Bristol-Myers Corporation (Bristol-Meyers) petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative for assistance in protecting
its patent rights in the Republic of Korea (Korea).' Bristol-Myers
alleged that Korea's discriminatory enforcement of its intellectual

* Foreign Legal Consultant, Seoul, Korea. Member, Connecticut and New York
Bars. J.D., 1988, Boston College; M.A., 1985, Washington College; B.A., 1983, University
of Maryland.
I thank Professor Eun-Jung Park of Ewha Women's University, College of Law,
Seoul, Korea for her invaluable assistance on research of Korean law and Sung-A Lee for
providing English translations of Korean text. This Article has also benefited from the
usual insights of William Carl Smith of Philadelphia. I extend a special note of gratitude
to the former judges of the Seoul District Court identified in this Article who graciously
gave their time for interviews and follow-up questions.
This Article is dedicated to In Soo'Rhimm (1933-1996), past Chairman of the Hollym
Group.
1. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 permits such petitions. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1994). The legislative purposes of the Act are, inter alia, "to foster the economic growth
of and full employment in the United States and to strengthen economic relations between the United States and foreign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world
trade," "to provide adequate procedures to safeguard [U.S.] industry and labor against
unfair or injurious import competition, and to assist industries, firm, [sic] workers, and
communities to adjust to changes in international trade flows." Id. § 2102(1), (4).
For a discussion of the practical effect of section 301 on U.S. businesses operating
in foreign countries, see David I. Wilson, A Trade Policy Goal for the 1990s: Improving
the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Intellectual Property Protection in Foreign Countries, 1
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 421, 423-36 (1988). For a report on the circumstances surrounding
Bristol-Myers' petition, see Industry Groups Press White House to Renew Section 301
Case Against Korea, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27, 1987, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Industry
Groups].
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2
property laws failed to protect the company's interests in Korea.
According to Bristol-Myers, U.S.-based firms involved in patent
infringement actions were subjected to a Korean bias against foreign expert testimony. 3 In addition, Korean judges reportedly required litigants to conduct their experiments in Korea in order to
4
be admissible as evidence.
As it relates to Korean evidentiary requirements, the BristolMyers episode may reflect judicial territorialism. 5 It may represent one jurisdiction's insistence that foreign litigants conform with
its established rules and practices. Whatever its proper characterization, the Bristol-Myers episode exemplifies the distinctions between Korean and U.S. evidentiary rules. Given the stark differences in the origins of their legal systems, it is not surprising that
these countries' evidentiary rules are also different. An independent sovereign for less than sixty years, Korea, 6 like Germany, em-

2. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 429.
3. See id.
4. See id.; Industry Groups,supra note 1, at 2.
5. See Industry Groups, supra note 1, at 2. "Bristol-Myers [eventually] withdrew its
petition to the [U.S. Trade Representative] after receiving assurances from South Korean
officials that the Souih Korean company (the defendant in the pending Bristol-Myers
case) would begin settlement discussions. The settlement negotiations ultimately broke
down." Wilson, supra note 1, at 430 (footnote omitted).
6. Korea occupies the peninsula in East Asia between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of
Japan. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 999
(3d ed. 1992). The Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan are known to Koreans as the "West
Sea" and "East Sea," respectively. See MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559, 1107 (1993). Korea is currently divided into two sovereignties: the Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, commonly known as North Korea. See ANDREW C. NAHM, INTRODUCTION
TO KOREAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 234, 238 (1993). A heavily armed demilitarized
zone (DMZ) divides the two Koreas-a result of the armistice that concluded the Korean
War in 1953. See id. at 252. Relations between the political leaders of North and South
Korea over the years have been tense, but hopes for reconciliation and talk of unification
continue.
Communist rule under Il-Sung Kim governed North Korea, sometimes referred to as
the "Hermit Kingdom," from the conclusion of the Korean War until his death in 1994.
See id. at 258-61. Kim's son, Jong-Il Kim, has reportedly assumed leadership, but Western observers continue to question the extent of his control and power. See Nicholas D.
Kristof, Kim Jong-Il Seems Firmly in Charge: NYT, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 22, 1996, at 2;
Kim Jong-Il Ill, Lacks Support of NK Military: German Source, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 23,
1996, at 2. For an insightful expos6 on the two Kims, see Michael Shapiro, Annals of
Authoritarianism:Kim's Ransom, NEW YORKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at 32. Information about
the legal system in North Korea is not readily available.

1997]

Expert Evidence: Korea v. United States

587

ploys a civil law system. 7 In contrast, the United States has a
common law system, which has operated under a single constitution for over two centuries.
This Article discusses Korea's rules of expert evidence and
compares them with the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence. Part II
introduces the basic characteristics of the Korean legal system. It
also describes Korea's modern judiciary, as well as Korea's rules of
civil procedure and evidence. Part III focuses on the Korean rules
governing expert evidence. A plain reading of these rules shows
that the Korean approach to expert evidence differs from its U.S.
counterpart. For example, the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence
contain several evidentiary principles that are not found in Korean
jurisprudence, thereby leaving more issues to Korean judges' discretion. Part IV discusses the Korean equivalents to the provisions
in the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining to expert evidence. It also explains how Korean courts address matters that
have no textual equivalents in the Korean rules. This comparative
analysis provides both an introduction to the rules of expert evidence in a foreign jurisdiction and an unconventional method for
examining the bases of U.S. rules and practices. Finally, Part V
advocates consideration of the Korean approach to expert evidence in reforming the much-criticized use of expert testimony in
U.S. courts.
II.

8
THE KOREAN LEGAL SYSTEM

A. Civil Law System
For many years, 9 neighboring nations' imperialistic designs
This Article focuses only on South Korea's legal principles.
7. See discussion infra Part II.A.
8. There is a limited number of materials in the English language on the study of
Korean law. See, e.g., DAE-KYu YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH
KOREA at vii (IFES Korean Studies Series No. 2, 1990). With increasing interest, the
number of relevant works is steadily growing. For helpful introductions to the subject,
see PYONG-CHOON HAHM, KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE (1986);
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA (Sang Hyun Song ed.,
1983) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW]; KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1996). These works also include recommended bibliographies.
9. For an introduction to Korea's social and political history, see generally NAHM,
supra note 6.
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victimized Korea.10 During the early part of the twentieth century, Japan claimed Korea as its protectorate and sent military
forces and administrative officials to operate Korea as a Japanese
province. 1 During this period, Japan crafted Korea's legal system
to serve its own colonialist interests. 12 In effect, Japanese rulers
13
implemented and incorporated a civil law approach.
In 1945, at the end of World War II, Korea claimed its independence as a sovereign nation within days of Japan's surrender to
the Allies. 14 The new Korean republic ultimately retained many
aspects of the legal system left by Japan. 15 Thus, several Korean
legal institutions, including law schools, the judiciary, and court
practices, resembled those established during Japanese colonial
rule. 16 To date, many law professors and practicing lawyers in Korea continue to be "heavily influenced by a Japanized European
'' 17
approach to law and legal scholarship.
Currently, the Korean legal system is very similar to the civil
legal systems in many European countries and unlike the AngloAmerican common law system in the United States. 18 One key
distinction between the Korean civil law system and the U.S.
common law system relates to their respective sources of law. "As
a result of the reception of the Civil Law System through Japan,"'19
the law in Korea "arises from codes, not court decisions. ' 20

10. See JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, KOREA: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WAR 3 (1982)
("Korea was-and is-one of those nations with the misfortune to lie at a crossroads of
world power politics, repeatedly stomped over, brutalized, and occupied by stronger
neighbors. In Korea's instance, the perpetual antagonists were China, Japan, and Russia.").
11. See id. at 8; KOREAN OVERSEAS INFO. SERV., A HANDBOOK OF KOREA 93 (9th
ed. 1993) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF KOREA].
12. See HAHM, supra note 8, at 144; David I. Steinberg, Law, Development and Korean Society, KOREANA Q., Fall 1971, at 43, reprinied in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW,
supra note 8, at 47, 52; YOON, supra note 8, at 23-24.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 14.
See HAHM, supra note 8, at 144.
See id. at 52-53; YOON, supra note 8, at 109.
See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 14.

Id.
See id. at 528.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 14.
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[A] court is bound primarily by codes and statutes; a judicial
decision is nothing but a product of interpretation of codes and
statutes; and the judicial decisions per se have no binding effect
as precedents for subsequent decisions. A judicial decision is
not a theory that states abstract doctrines of law; it is a resolu21
tion of a specific and individual dispute.
There are, however, de jure and de facto exceptions to this
rule. By statute, a higher court's decision with respect to findings
of fact and law binds the lower court to which the judgment is remanded. 22 Further, the established opinions of the higher courts
generally exert significant influence on subsequent court decisions.23 Lower court judges are mindful of Korean Supreme Court
rulings, 24 and desire to limit instances of reversal. 25 Nevertheless,
"[t]he doctrine of stare decisis does not [apply] in Korea as a matter of theory," 26 and judicial precedents do not necessarily bind
27
Korean judges.
Although this Article does not attempt an exhaustive discussion of the civil and common law systems, it is important to note
that there are significant differences in the way the two systems
conduct ordinary adjudication. One commentator distinguished

21. Id. at 17.
22. See COURT ORGANIZATION ACT art. 8, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301-1 to 301-2 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992)
("Any decision made in a judgment of a higher court shall bind the lower instance with
respect to the case."); INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 1023 ("An inferior
court is bound by the interpretation of law rendered by the Supreme Court when a judgment of the lower court is reversed upon appeal and the case is remanded.").
Citations to Korean statutes in this Article are to the unofficial English translations, which are included in the six-volume Current Laws of the Republic of Korea, edited
and published by the Korea Legislation Research Institute. Translations of some Korean
phrases and legal terms are inexact and imprecise and do not always capture the special
nuances.
23. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 1023.

24. See id. at 18. For a description of the Korean judiciary, see discussion infra Part
II.B.
25. "[Tjhere seems to be little doubt for any observer of judicial life about the enormous importance for inferior judges of the previous sentences of the Supreme
Court ....Hence, [there is] strong encouragement (especially among career-minded
judges) to comply with the interpretive guidelines set by the Supreme Court." INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 274.

26. Id. at 18; see YOON, supra note 8, at 65.
27. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 18.
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these two processes by describing the Common Law procedure as
"the day in Court system" and the Civil Law system as the "dental
clinic form of trial."' 28 Common law judges are described as
"depositaries of the Law," and civil law judges are considered the
"mouth of the Law."' 29 These analogies reflect the widely divergent configurations of the judges' roles in the two systems. 30
One commentator has described civil law judges as "passive"
participants in the adjudication process. 31 A civil law judge is generally passive in most situations and may take an active stand only
in a few situations: (1) the judge may declare himself or herself.
jurisdictionally incompetent-a decision that a superior court may
review and overturn; (2) during the proof-taking period, the judge
may refuse to accept or validate some of the proofs presented-a
decision that is also appealable to a superior court; and (3) during
the final phase of the process and prior to issuing his or her orders,
the judge may order additional proof.32
Despite the comparative characterization of civil law judges,
the commentator also recognizes that these judges can actively
participate in the taking of evidence. 33 In practice, Korean rules
give judges broad authority to ascertain facts. 34 Where the rules
are silent regarding specific issues that arise in ordinary adjudication, the court retains great discretion and latitude.
Scholars commenting on societal attitudes toward law and
dispute resolution emphasize the Korean cultural distaste for litigation. 35 One particular Korean commentator notes:
Koreans have abhorred the black-and-white designation of one
party to a dispute as right and his opponent as wrong. Assigning all blame to one for the sake of rendering a judgment has

28. Id. at 276.
29. Id. at 270.
30. See id. "[I]n basic contrast with his Common Law counterpart, the Civil Law
judge is but a 'kind of expert clerk,' a distinguished bureaucrat, but a bureaucrat nonetheless. This configuration of the judge as a civil servant at the service of the Public Administration entails a number of decisive consequences." Id. at 271.
31. See id. at 275.
32. See id. at 275-76.
33. See id.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
35. See HAHM, supra note 8, at 95-96.
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been repugnant to the fundamental valuation of harmony, because such a judgment has retarded swift restoration of broken
harmony ....

[I]f discord could not be avoided, society de-

manded the quickest restoration of broken concord. For this
purpose mediation has been preferred to adjudication because
it does not require the fixing of blame. Parties themselves formulate the solution by mutual agreement, thus obviating the
need for an external sanction. Since mediation is possible only
when both sides are willing to compromise, each side has to
36
give a little and to be satisfied with less than complete victory.
Korean society may indeed be less litigious than U.S. sociTrial court dockets indicate, however, that litigation in Korea has sharply increased in recent years. 38 Korean judges complain of overwork and limited resources. 39 The increase in
litigation may be attributed to rapid commercial growth, indus40
trialization, and economic development in Korean society.
Without any available empirical studies, however, these factors are
merely speculative.
ety. 37

36. Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. Korea has far fewer lawyers per capita than the United States. One study reporting the number of legal professionals, defined as judges, prosecutors, and attorneys, in
selected countries showed that there was one legal professional per 19,000 people in Korea, compared with one per 454 in the United States. See YOON, supra note 8, at 128 tbl.
3. Unlike in the United States, where individual state bar associations regulate the number of applicants who may pass the bar examination, in Korea, the national government
assumes this responsibility. See Chang Soo Yang, The Judiciaryin Contemporary Society:
Korea, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 303, 304 (1993); YOON, supra note 8, at 118. In recent yeas, the pass rate for the Korean bar examination has been between two to three
percent. See Yang, supra, at 304. Not surprisingly, the legal profession tends to be more
respected in Korea than in the United States. See generally INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW,
supra note 8, at 278-80; YOON, supra note 8, at 117, 126-33.
38. See Yang, supra note 37, at 309-10 & nn.15-16. Professor Yang notes:
Heavy caseloads create obstacles to the systematic improvement of legal services. Normal litigation cases which impose the heaviest burdens on judges have
increased more than 100 percent. Consequently, the court is short of judges.
This might prevent the court from guaranteeing the citizen's right to trial because of chronic trial date tardiness.
Id. at 309-10 (footnotes omitted).
39. See Interview with Meong-Ho Jeon, Seoul District Court Judge, 1993-1995 (July
3, 1996) [hereinafter Jeon Interview I].
40. But cf. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 68-69 ("The spectacular
economic growth rates of Korea and the attraction of significant foreign investment have
not-been possible without the internationalization of law ... ").
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B. Korean Judiciary
In contrast to the federalist system of government in the
United States, Korea employs a parliamentary system. 42 Thus,
unlike the dual state and federal court systems in the United
States, Korea has a single judiciary. The Korean Constitution
states that "judicial power shall be vested in courts composed of
judges." 43 It further provides for the basic structure of the judiciary: "The courts shall be composed of the Supreme Court, which
is the highest court of the State, and other courts at specified levels." 44 Through the Court Organization Act,45 Korea's National

41. For a discussion of the history of Korean judicial review, see YOON, supra note 8,
at 150-99.
42. For a description of the differences between the federal and parliamentary systems, see generally GARY K. BERTSCH ET AL., COMPARING POLITICAL SYSTEMS:
POWER AND POLICY IN THREE WORLDS 111-24 (1978).
The Korean Constitution provides that the nation "shall be a democratic republic."
KOREA CONST. art. 1(1), translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3,
3 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). It also provides for three branches of government similar to the U.S. government. The legislature is presently a unicameral body.
See id. art. 40, translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 8 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992) ("The legislative power shall be vested in the National Assembly."). "Executive power [is] vested in the Executive Branch headed by the
President." Id. art. 66(4), translatedin 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3,
12 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). The President is "elected by universal,
equal, direct and secret ballot by the people," Id. art. 67(1), translated in 1 CURRENT
LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 12 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
Finally, "bludicial power [is] vested in courts composed of judges." Id. art. 101(1), translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 17 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
Thus, the parliamentary system in Korea is similar to the systems in some democratic
nations in Western Europe. The democratic processes in Korea, however, are still undergoing changes. For example, in June 1995, governors and city officials were directly
elected. See Steven Brull, After Spurt of Growth, Time for "Awkward Stage", INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Iht File; South Korea's
Ruling Party Heads for Large Losses in Elections, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, June
28, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Dpa File.
43. KOREA CONST. art. 101(1), translatedin 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 3, 17 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
44. Id. art. 101(2), translatedin 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 17
(Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). This provision of Korea's Constitution is
similar in content and purpose to Article III, Section I of the U.S. Constitution, which
reads: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

1997]

Expert Evidence: Korea v. United States

593

Assembly established a judicial structure similar to the U.S. federal and state court systems.
Thus, Korea's judiciary consists of one supreme court, 46 trial
courts, 47 and intermediate appellate courts. 48 In addition, Korea's
45. See COURT ORGANIZATION ACT art. 4(l), translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301 to 301-1 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
46. The Korean Supreme Court is comprised of 13 Justices and one Chief Justice. See
id. art. 4(2), translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301 to 3011 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). The President, with the consent of the
National Assembly, appoints the Chief Justice. See KOREA CONST. art. 104(1), translated
in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 18 (Korea Legislation Research
Inst. ed., 1992). The President, on recommendation from the Chief Justice and with the
consent of the National Assembly, appoints the remaining 13 Justices. See id. art. 104(2),
translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 18 (Korea Legislation
Research Inst. ed., 1992). All Supreme Court Justices, except for the Chief Justice, serve
renewable six-year terms. See id. art. 105(1)-(2), translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 18 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). The Chief Justice's six-year term is not renewable. See id. art. 105(1), translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 18 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort for the following cases:
1. Case of a final appeal against a judgment of the high court, appellate court,
or patent court;
2. Case of a reappeal against a decision or decree of the final appeal court,
high court, appellate court or patent court; and
3. Cases coming under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under other
laws.
COURT ORGANIZATION ACT art. 14, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC

OF KOREA 301, 301-3 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
47. Korea's district courts are trial courts with general, original jurisdiction over most
civil actions. See COURT ORGANIZATION ACT arts. 32, 34, translated in 2 CURRENT
LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301-7 to 301-8 (Korea Legislation Research

Inst. ed., 1992). Depending on the complexity of the proceedings, either a single judge or
a panel of three judges, referred to as a collegiate court, conducts the proceedings. See id.
arts. 7(5), 32, 34, translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301-1,
301-7 to 301-8 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). The Court Organization Act

also provides for specialized Patent, Family, and Administrative Courts. See id. art. 3(1),
translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301 (Korea Legislation

Research Inst. ed., 1992).
A collegiate court has original jurisdiction over the following cases: (1) "Cases
that the collegiate court itself decides to judge in the collegiate court"; (2) Civil actions

prescribed by the Supreme Court; (3) Most cases where the permitted punishment includes capital punishment, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for more than one year;
(4) Cases of complicity; (5) Cases where district court judges are disqualified or recused;

and (6) "Cases coming under the competence of the collegiate court of the district court
under other laws." Id. art. 32(1), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 301, 301-7 to 301-8 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). A collegiate
court has appellate jurisdiction over the following cases: (1) "A case of appeal against a
judgment of a single judge of the district court," and (2) "A case of appeal against a deci-
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Constitution provides for the Constitutional Court, a separate tribunal with prescribed jurisdiction over certain constitutional issues
49
and specified cases.
sion or decree of a single judge of the district court." Id. art. 32(2), translated in 2
CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301-8 (Korea Legislation Research
Inst. ed., 1992).
Decisions by a single district court judge are appealable to the collegiate court. See
id. Decisions by the original trial court may be appealed. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art.
360(1), translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-50 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
48. The High Court, the intermediate appellate court, has jurisdiction over the following cases:
1. Cases of appeal against a judgment made in the first instance by a collegiate
court of the district court, the family court, or administrative court;
2. Cases of appeal against an a judgment, decision or decree made in the first instance by a collegiate court of [the] district court, family court, or administrative
court; and
3. Cases coming under the jurisdiction of the high court under other laws.
COURT ORGANIZATION ACT art. 28, translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA 301, 301-6 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). Cases that may, by
statute, be further appealed are submitted to the Supreme Court. See id. art. 14(3),
translatedin 2 CURRENr LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 301, 301-3 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
49. See KOREA CONST. art. 111(1), translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 19 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). For a discussion of
the origins of the Constitutional Court, see YOON, supra note 8, at 156. For a helpful
piece on the workings of the Constitutional Court, see James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon,
The ConstitutionalCourt of the Republic of Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudenceof the
Vortex?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1990).
Article 111(1) of the Korean Constitution provides:
The Constitutional Court shall adjudicate the following matters:
1. The unconstitutionality of a law upon the request of the courts;
2. Impeachment;
3. Dissolution of a political party;
4. Disputes about the jurisdictions between State agencies, between State
agencies and local governments and between local governments; and
5. Petitions relating to the Constitution as prescribed by law.
KOREA CONST. art. 111(1), translatedin 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
3, 19 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). The Constitutional Court's prescribed
areas of review are repeated in the CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT art. 2, translated in 2
CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 91, 91 (Korea Legislation Research Inst.
ed., 1992).
Nine judges serve on the Constitutional Court. See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
ACT art. 3, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 91, 91 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). In form, the President must appoint all nine judges;
in practice, however, the President has the power to selects only three judges. See id. art.
6(1)-(2), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 91, 91-1 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). The National Assembly and the Chief Jtstice of the
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It is, of course, difficult to describe the "personality" or
"character" of any judicial system beyond global characterizations,
regardless of the jurisdiction. Due to its relatively brief period of
operation, the Korean judiciary is difficult to describe, even in
general terms. One commentator writes:
[There is] a feeling among students of the power process, as
well as among the legal profession, that the judicial process in
Korea has not yet reached that stage of development where it
can be considered sufficiently "mature." It is often observed
that, having had less than two decades of self-government and a
large portion of that wasted by war, the Korean judiciary has
not yet been able to emerge with its own developed personality.50
If war and post-war restoration have delayed the emergence of a
judicial personality in the first two decades of Korea, the turbulence and turmoil in Korean politics during the subsequent three
decades have further impeded its development. Indeed, in the past
thirty years, the country has experienced one presidential assassiSupreme Court each select three judges, whom the President subsequently "appoints."
See id., translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 91, 91-1 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). With the consent of the National Assembly, the
President chooses the Constitutional Court president from the nine judges. See id. art
12(1)-(2), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 91, 91-1 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
Constitutional Court judges serve renewable six-year terms. See id. art. 7(1),
translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 91, 91-1 (Korea Legislation
Research Inst. ed., 1992). They must retire at the age of 65, except for the president of
the Constitutional Court, who retires at age 70. See id. art. 7(2), translatedin 2 CURRENT
LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 91, 91-1 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
Korean law students often compare the roles of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Many ask which of the two is the "superior court." Korea's Constitution, which was most recently amended in October 1987, pronounces that "the Supreme
Court ...is the highest court of the State." KOREA CONST. art. 101(2), translatedin 1
CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3, 17 (Korea Legislation Research Inst.

ed., 1992). The National Assembly re-affirmed this point in the Court Organization Act,
which declares that "[t]he Supreme Court shall be the highest court." COURT ORGANIZATION ACT art. 11, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
301, 301-3 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). Despite the proclamations, Korea's Constitution, presumably the supreme law of the land, explicitly provides for the
Constitutional Court, which is the only and final arbiter of matters of a constitutional nature. KOREA CONST. arts. 111-113, translatedin 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 3, 19-20 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). Thus, questions about
which court is the higher court and which is mqre highly regarded evade simple answers.
50. HAHM, supra note 8, at 112.
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nation, a military coup, twelve years of rule by military-backed
presidents, 51 and continuing public unrest, marked most noticeably
51. After a coup in 1961, Army General Chung-Hee Park held nearly two decades of
unchallenged power. See HANDBOOK OF KOREA, supra note 11, at 116-17. His assassination in October 1979 triggered months of political unrest. See id. at 117. Prime Minister Kyu-Hah Cfioi served as interim president, as dictated by Korea's Constitution. See
id. Army Major General Doo-HwanChun led a military coup in December 1979, dealt
swiftly with resisting military leaders and political officials, suspended the National Assembly, ordered a revision of Korea's Constitution, and ultimately emerged as Korea's
self-proclaimed President. See id. at 117-18. Chun and fellow General Tae-Woo Roh allegedly masterminded the brutal crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in the infamous May 18, 1980 incident in the southwestern city of Kwangju, which resulted in the
deaths of over 200 civilians. See Background on S. Korea Trial, UPI, Aug. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Chronology of S. Korea's Bloody 1980 Civil Uprising, Reuters North American Wire, Nov. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Reuna File. Chun's military coup and the "Kwangju Massacre" are indelibly marked in
Korea's history. See HANDBOOK OF KOREA, supra note 11, at 117-18.
Chun served as president until 1987. See id. at 118. His successor, Roh, won a
presidential election over opposition party leaders, Dae-Joong Kim and Young-Sam Kim.
See id. at 118-19. At the conclusion of Roh's five-year term in 1992, Young-Sam Kim won
the presidential election. See id. at 119. Young-Sam Kim is often described as Korea's
first civilian president in 37 years. See id.
After Young-Sam Kim assumed office, opposition leaders demanded the prosecution of Chun and Roh for their roles in the coup and the crackdown in Kwangju. See
generally Background on S. Korea Trial, supra; Chronology of S. Korea's Bloody 1980
Civil Uprising,supra. In December 1995, prosecutors revealed that both Roh and Chun
amassed millions of dollars in secret slush funds. See Sung-Chul Kang, Chun Sentenced to
Death, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 27, 1996, at 1; Hak-Lim Shin, Chun Gets Death, Roh 22 1/2
Years, KOREA TIMES, Aug. 27, 1996, at 1. These funds consisted largely, if not wholly, of
bribes collected from chairmen of business conglomerates. See Kang, supra. Both Chun
and Roh were subsequently arrested and indicted for not only bribery but also mutiny,
treason, and insurrection based on the "Kwangju Massacre." See Shin, supra. Business
leaders were accused of giving bribes, and military leaders who took part in the Kwangju
incident were also charged. See id. In August 1996, at the conclusion of what was described as Korea's "trial of the century," Chun received the death penalty and Roh received a sentence of 22 years in prison; both also received fines. See Kang, supra; Shin,
supra; Russell Watson & Jeffrey Bartholet, Getting Back at Dictators, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
9, 1996, at 51.
On appeal, the Seoul High Court upheld the convictions of Chun and Rob and almost
all of the other defendants, but the Court commuted Chun's death sentence to life imprisonment and reduced Roh's imprisonment term from 22 years to 17 years. See Chun's
Death Commuted to Life in Prison, KOREA TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1; Chun's Death
Sentence Commuted, KOREA HERALD, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1. The appellate court assessed
fines of 263 billion won (about U.S.$330 million) and 226 billion won (about U.S.$280
million) to Chun and Roh, respectively-the same amounts that Chun and Roh had
amassed illegally. See Chun's Death Commuted to Life in Prison,supra. The Seoul High
Court judges reportedly justified their decisions to reduce Chun's sentence in light of his
contribution to the country's economic development during his presidency and the peace-
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by occasional violent student demonstrations. 52
Any discussion of the Korean judiciary and judicial review
must take into account Korea's political history. As in every country, law and politics in Korea are inextricably intertwined. 53 The
relationship between them is particularly poignant in Korea because military-backed dictators ruled the country for most of its
history. 54 One observer describes the Korean situation as one of
"politics above law."55 "A characteristic feature of law in Korea
is
that it tends to be diminished primarily for the purpose of achieving a political goal, rather than for upholding the rule-of-law. '56
"[L]acking a tradition of judicial independence,. . . Korea needs to
ful transfer of power in 1987. See id.
Although Chun and Roh chose not to appeal further to the Korean Supreme Court,
the prosecution asked the Supreme Court to examine the High Court's sentences for
Chun, Roh, and many of the other defendants. Chun, Roh Give Up Supreme Court Appeals, KOREA HERALD, Dec. 24, 1996, at 3.
52. Student protests have long been a part of the Korean political landscape. Student-led demonstrations preceded the downfall of Korea's first president, Syng-Myun
Rhee, in 1960. See HANDBOOK OF KOREA, supra note 11, at 115. Widespread demonstrations, many of them violent, protested the authority and policies of the Chun administration.
Hanchongnyon, a radical student group demanding reunification with North Korea
and governance under the policy of juche, or self-rule, orchestrated the latest round of
demonstrations. See Students, Police Continue Face-Off,KOREA HERALD, Aug. 19,1996,
at 1. In August 1996, coinciding with the 51st anniversary of Korea's liberation from
Japanese rule, the student group held pro-unification rallies that were outlawed and reportedly planned a symbolic march to Panmunjom, the peace village near the DMZ. See
id.; Police, Students Clash Again, Hundreds Injured, KOREA HERALD; Aug. 16, 1996, at 1.
Students faced off against heavily armed police and military troops. See Police, Students
Clash Again, Hundreds Injured, supra;Students, Police Continue Face-Off, supra; see also
Police Raid Ends Yonsei Protest,KOREA HERALD, Aug. 21, 1996, at 1; President Vows to
Root Out Pro-North Student Elements, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 22, 1996, at 1; Special Task
ForceSet to Hunt Down Core Hanchongnyon Members, KOREA TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at
1; 462 Students Formally Charged, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 23,1996, at 1.
53. "[L]aw and politics stand in an antinomic relationship: law is created by politics,
but it has to be freed from politics if it is to function as intended." YOON, supra note 8, at
71 (citing JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 146, 148 (1964)).
54. Civilians served as Presidents from the founding of Korea in 1945 until 1960.
Army General Park led a coup in 1961 and ruled with military-backed power until his assassination in October 1979. See HANDBOOK OF KOREA, supra note 11, at 116-17. Two
months later, Army General Chun led a coup and served as President until 1987. See id.
at 117-18. Chun's classmate from the Korea Military Academy and fellow General, Roh,
won the presidential election in 1987 and served as President until 1992. See id. at 118-19.
55. YOON, supra note 8, at 70.
56. Id.
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establish a legislature capable of restraining the executive from
57
encroachment."
Korea's Constitution mandates that judges "shall rule independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the
Constitution and law." 58 No one seriously believes, however, that
the Korean judiciary has been truly autonomous from politics or
free from the influence of ruling regimes. A commentator observes:
Judges themselves question the independence of the court.
A survey conducted by [the] Seoul Lawyer's Association in
March 1980 showed that sixty-seven percent of judges believed
independence of the court was not fairly achieved. Eightythree percent also responded that sometimes interpretation and
application of law did not match their conscience and notion of
justice. Moreover, eighty-five percent criticized the Supreme
59
Court's effort to insure independence as insufficient.
The same commentator acknowledges, however, that the "[r]ecent
democratic development has altered this situation to some degree."'60 The judiciary appears to be quietly staking out a more assertive presence among the three branches of government. 61
C. Rules of Korean and U.S. Litigation
One observer of the Korean legal scene offers this concise, although oversimplified, summary of the Korean adjudication process:
[Korea's] procedural system has been described as a clockwork
system aimed at achieving the greatest possible uniformity,
automatism and predictability, as well as the maximum possible
protection of the parties' interests. The result is a complex, at
times tortuous, process in which three main phases may be distinguished: introductory, proof-taking and decision-making. 62
The introductory stage of an adjudication in Korean courts is
57. Dan Fenno Henderson, Forewordto YOON, supra note 8, at v.
58. KOREA CONST. art. 103, translated in 1 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 3, 18 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
59. Yang, supra note 37, at 312-13.
60. Id. at 313.
61. See West & Yoon, supra note 49, at 115.
62. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 276.
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not dramatically different from the pleading stage in the U.S. setting. The service and filing of a complaint initiate the case. 63 The
complaint states "the legal and factual grounds upon which the
prayer for relief is based and describes the evidence that the plaintiff wishes to be considered. '64 The answer sets forth the
"defendant's denials, defenses, set-offs, counterclaims and evi65
dence.,
There is no clear demarcation between the introductory and
proof-taking stage in Korean courts. 66 "Evidence is taken during
the proof-taking stage at various hearings, separated by periods of
weeks or months. ' 67 The decision stage follows, beginning with a
public hearing where litigants may submit their briefs and present
their oral arguments to the court. 68 Thereafter, the court renders
its judgment. 69
The Code of Civil Procedure, 70 which the National Assembly
enacted in 1960 and has periodically amended, governs practice
and procedure in Korean courts. It works as an omnibus statute of
procedure and contains the rules of civil procedure, evidence, and
appellate procedure. 71 It also contains Korean equivalents to
many of the rules in the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id. Additionally, Professor Song makes the following observation about the
courtroom advocate in Korea:
The introduction of the cross examination is of special importance. Trial lawyers
in Korea have yet to learn the examination skills more fully. Lacking experience, many Korean lawyers are clumsy amateurs in the examination of witnesses. Their questions are in many instances, apt to be inept and timeconsuming. Even now some lawyers simply read aloud the written topics and
ask a witness to answer yes or no. The grossly leading question is very common.
Cross examination though frequently used, is often a mere repetition of the direct examination or is unduly argumentative.
Id. at 1026-27.
69. See id.
70. CODE OF CIV. PROC., translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 753 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
71. See CODE OF CIv. PROC. bk. II (Proceedings in First Instance), bk. III (Appeal),
translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-32 to 753-57
(Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
72. Structurally, the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are divided into eleven
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relating to matters such as commencement of action, 73 service of
process, 74 pleadings and motions, 75 parties, 76 trials, 77 and judgment. 78 The Code of Civil Procedure does not, however, provide
for equivalents to depositions and discovery proceedings 79 or jury
trials provided under the federal rules.80 The lack of jury trials
and pre-trial discovery in Korea represents a radical departure
from litigation practice in the United States. They are also significant factors that affect the subject matter of this Article-expert
81
evidence in Korea.
Because Korea does not employ a jury system, the task of
fact-finding is left to the judge. 82 A common observation among
comparative commentators is that "[t]he administration of justice
sections with roman numeral headings and consecutively numbered rules under each
heading. The Korean Code of Civil Procedure is divided into twelve Books, which are
further divided into Chapters, with individual rules in consecutively numbered articles.
73. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. bk. II (Proceedings in First Instance), translated in 2
CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-32 to 753-50 (Korea Legislation
Research Inst. ed., 1992).
74. See id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 3 (Service), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-23 to 753-26 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
75. See id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 1 (Pleadings), bk. II, ch. II (Pleadings and Preparation
Therefor), translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-17 to
753-22, 753-36 to 753-37 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
76. See id. bk. I, ch. II (Parties), translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 753, 753-6 to 753-12 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
77. See id. bk I, ch. IV (Litigation Proceedings), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-17 to 753-32 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed.,
1992).
78. See id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 4 (Judgment), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-26 to 753-30 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
79. U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 govern depositions and discovery in U.S. federal courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
80. Thus, there are no Korean equivalents for the following U.S. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Rule 38 (Jury Trial of Right), 39(a) (Trial by Jury), 47 (Selection of Jurors), 48 (Number of Jurors-Participation in Verdict), and 51 (Instruction to Jury: Objection).
81. Evidentiary, not discovery, rules govern the production of documents and the examination of witnesses. Expert witnesses in Korea are not subject to deposition before
trial. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. bk. II, Ch. III, §§ 2, 4, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-39 to 753-42, 753-44 to 753-46 (Korea Legislation Research Instituted ed., 1992). They are court-appointed, and cross-examination is allowed
only with court approval. See Interview with Byung-Chol Yoon, Seoul District Court
Judge, 1990-1992 (July 6, 1996) [hereinafter Yoon Interview]. See also infra text accompanying notes 139-142.
82. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 528, 1026.
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in Korea is 'judge-oriented' rather than 'lawyer-oriented.' ' 83 With
the search for truth as the court's primary goal, judges take an active role in interviewing interested parties and potential witnesses. 84 In Korea, as in other civil law jurisdictions, the determination of truth is neither left to chance nor intended to be a
residue of the adversarial process.
D. Korean Rules of Evidence
A chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure contains the Korean
rules of evidence, 85 which are consolidated into seven sections:
General Rules, Examination of Witness, Expert Testimony,
Documentary Evidence, Inspection, Examination of Parties, and
Preservation of Evidence. 86 These rules, either explicitly or implicitly, give trial judges broad discretion on matters of proof. For
example, explicit rules grant the court independent powers to
gather evidence; 87 the absence of provisions on issues such as relevance and hearsay, however, render judges responsible for resolving such matters.
If a Korean court is not satisfied with the evidence that
the
parties offer, the Code of Civil Procedure empowers it to "conduct
investigation of evidence upon its own authority." 88 Clearly, the
U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence do not provide such broad authority. In practice, the Korean rules allow the court to summon witnesses not called by either party.89 In addition, the Code of Civil
Procedure authorizes the court to "undertake investigation of evi-

83. See id. at 528.
84. By rule and practice, the court has broad power and discretion to investigate and
ascertain facts toward adjudication of the claims. See infra text accompanying notes 8891.
85. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. bk. II, ch. III (Evidence), translated in 2 CURRENT
LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-37 to 753-48 (Korea Legislation Research

Inst. ed., 1992).
86. See id., translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-37

to 753-48 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
87. See id. art. 265, translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,

753-38 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
88. Id., translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-38

(Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
89. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39.
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dence out of court." 90 The rules further elaborate that another
judge or a public or a private organization may conduct that ex91
amination.
,For individuals accustomed to the provisions in the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence that address specific evidentiary issues, the
Code of Civil Procedure's absence of guidelines on relevance and
hearsay is striking. Contrasting the Korean rules with the U.S.
Federal Rules of Evidence is instructive here. The U.S. Federal
Rules of Evidence define relevance 9 2 and dictate that only relevant evidence is admissible. 93 Relevant evidence may nevertheless
be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by such factors as
unfair prejudice, cumulative evidence, and delay. 94 The Korean
rules do not have equivalent provisions. According to several
former Seoul District Court judges, Korean courts resolve relevance issues in a manner quite similar to their U.S. federal coun-

terparts."

Unlike the U.S. federal courts, which apply explicit

90. CODE OF CIV PROC. art. 269(1), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE RE-

PUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-38 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). There are,
however, limitations on the court's authority to investigate evidence outside the court.
Although the rules do not explicitly so state, if the court intends to examine evidence out
of court, it must give notice to the parties, who have the right to be present at any investigative activity. Thus, in both the United States and Korea, the district court's unaccompanied visit to an out of court location to confirm the accuracy of a witness' testimony
probably would not be allowed. For a discussion of this limitation on U.S. trial judges, see
City of Columbus v. Carter, 49 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
91.

See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 269(2), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-38 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
92. See FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
93. See FED. R. EvID 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
94. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
95. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Interview with Hyun-Chul Lee, Seoul District
Court Judge, 1994-1995 (July 1996) [hereinafter Lee Interview]; Interview with Jung-Keol

Suh, Seoul District Court Judge, 1991-1993 (July 20, 1996) [hereinafter Suh Interview I];
Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
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96
rules, Korean courts simply use established practices.
There is little discussion of relevance in Korean legal commentary. One of the few articles covering this subject purports to
compare the Korean and U.S. approaches to relevance. 97 The article defines relevance as "the probability to be able to infer the
existence of the fact as important evidence" 98 and points out
somewhat tautologically that "not all evidence can be ... material
to the judgment and.., relevant evidence shall only be adopted as
the evidence." 99 The article points out that Korean law does not
provide a specific standard for determining relevance; rather, this
determination rests on the judge's experience and common
sense. 100
The Code of Civil Procedure also fails to address hearsay,
which the Federal Rules of Evidence discuss extensively. 101 Thus,
in Korea, all decisions relating to hearsay are left to the judge's
discretion.
The lack of judicial discussion and scholarly commentary on
relevance and hearsay issues are largely a result of Korea's civil
law system wherein judges act as the sole triers of fact. As both

96. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Lee Interview, supra note 95; Suh Interview
I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
Generally, decisions on probative value rest with the judge. See John Y. Lee, Fair
Trial Standards and Korean Criminal Law and Procedures, 6 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 13
(1978).
97. Kwang-ll Choo, Jeung-guh-eue Gwal-lyun-sung Geh-suhl, 26 BUB JUN 97 (1977),
translated in The Introduction of Relevance Between Evidences (1977) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Journal).
98. Id. at 99, translated in The Introduction of Relevance Between Evidences 1
(1977) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Internationaland
ComparativeLaw Journal).
99. Id., translated in The Introduction of Relevance Between Evidences 1 (1977)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Internationaland Comparative Law Journal).
100. See id., translated in The Introduction of Relevance Between Evidences 1 (1977)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and ComparativeLaw Journal).
101. See FED. R. EvID. 801-806. The headings of these rules are: Rule 801
(Definitions), Rule 802 (Hearsay Rule), Rule 803 (Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of
Declarant Immaterial), Rule 804 (Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable), Rule 805
(Hearsay Within Hearsay), and Rule 806 (Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Declarant). See id.
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the arbiter and trier of fact, the court often entertains admissibility
and sufficiency questions simultaneously, and.the lines drawn between the issues are blurred. As a result, evidentiary rulings do
not have the import in Korean adjudication as they do in U.S.
courts. During a trial, Korean judges need not make prompt rulings on admissibility, and often do not in practice. 10 2 Routinely,
judges do not even discuss evidentiary rulings until judgments are
announced. Often, discussions of the sufficiency of evidence over10 3
take admissibility questions.
III.

EXPERT EVIDENCE IN KOREA

10 4

The articles in the Code of Civil Procedure that address evidentiary matters contain the rules governing expert evidence in
Korean courts. The corresponding provisions in the U.S. Federal
Rules of Evidence address issues such as qualification of the ex10 5
pert witness and the scope, form, and basis of expert testimony.
In contrast, the Korean rules address more procedural matters.
Thus, the Code of Civil Procedure provisions focus on matters
such as the method of appointment of an expert witness, 10 6 the
procedure for challenging the appointment of a witness, 10 7 court
requests for written testimony, 108 and court requests for expert
testimony from an organization rather than an individual. 10 9
The most striking difference between the Korean and U.S.
rules on expert evidence is the method for selecting and appoint102. See Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
103. See id.
104. This Article focuses on expert evidence in the civil action setting in Korea. The
basic parameters of the presentation of expert evidence in civil and criminal actions in the
jurisdiction are quite similar. Provisions for expert evidence in criminal actions are included in the PENAL PROC. CODE arts. 169 to 179-2, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 815, 815-25 to 815-27 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed.,
1992).
105. See FED. R. EvID. 702-705.
106. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 308, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
107. See id. art. 310, translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,
753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
108. See id. art. 312, translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,
753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
109. See id. art. 314, translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,
753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
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ing expert witnesses. While the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence
allow the parties to retain their own expert witnesses,11 0 the Korean Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides that only the
court may appoint these witnesses.111 This single difference
greatly impacts the manner in which each jurisdiction gathers and
presents expert evidence. It also results in two starkly contrasting
systems.
A. Expert Witnesses in Korea
Article 308 of the Korean Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"An expert witness shall be appointed by the court of suit, a
commissioned judge or an entrusted judge."112 Article 306 states
that "[a]ny person who is possessed of erudition and/or experience
necessary for giving expert testimony" may qualify as an expert
witness. 113 Together, these two rules indicate the court's reverence for the expert witness. The expert witness in Korea is normally regarded either .as an individual with advanced scholarship
in a particular field or discipline or as one holding an occupation
requiring a certifiable or licensed skill. As one former Seoul District Court judge explained, the court-appointed expert witness is
seen as someone who can lend special or critical analysis.11 4 In
brief, individuals qualified to be court-appointed expert witnesses

110. See FED. R. EvID. 706(d) ("Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert
witnesses of their own selection.").
111. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 308, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). In practice, parties may submit nominees for the court-appointed expert witness. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
Parties may also retain witnesses to give expert testimony, but the court considers parties'
witnesses to be regular witnesses, not "court-appointed experts." See infra note 148.
112. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 308, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC

OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
113. Id. art. 306(1), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,
753-42 to 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). Article 313, which governs
examination of the expert witness, repeats the reference to "facts of which [the expert
witness] has come to knowledge by erudition or experience." Id. art. 313, translated in 2
CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research
Inst. ed., 1992). The equivalent provision in the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence is Rule
702. See infra text accompanying note 151.
114. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39.
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are viewed as either "men of letters" 115 or specialized profession116
als who can serve as court assistants.
The text of the Korean rules appears to require testimony
from individuals who are qualified to give expert opinions. 117 This
mandatory testimony requirement is absent in the U.S. Federal
Rules of Evidence. Article 306(1) of the Korean Code of Civil
Procedure, entitled "Obligation to Give Expert Testimony," provides that a person qualified to give expert testimony "shall bear
the obligation to give such testimony." 118 In theory, this provision
115. The phrasing is not intended to be chauvinistic or sexist. Although empirical statistics are not available, interviews with former judges who served for a combined 10
years in Korean district courts indicate that they rarely saw or appointed women as expert
witnesses. See Interview with Meong-Ho Jeon, Seoul District Court Judge, 1993-1995
(Oct. 14, 1996); Interview with Jung-Keol Suh, Seoul District Court Judge, 1991-1993
(Oct. 17, 1996); Interview with Jee-Soo Rhee, Suwon District Court Judge, 1988-1990,
Seoul District Family Court Judge, 1990-1993,Cheongju District Court Judge, 1993-1994
(Oct. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Rhee Interview]. Of the five former judges interviewed for
this Article, Rhee is the lone woman.
The reality is that Korea always has been, and continues to be, a male-dominated
society. To many, the provision in Korea's Constitution that "[a]ll citizens shall be equal
before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex" rings hollow. KOREA CONST. art. 11(1), translated in 1
CURRENT LAWS OFTHE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3,4 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed.,
1992). For a discussion of the cultural origins of gender roles and attitudes in Korea, see
DIANE YU, WINDS OF CHANGE (1995). See also Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul Journal: In
Sexist South Korea, the Girls Even the Score, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1996, at 4 ("South Korea remains overwhelmingly a man's world. Aside from Islamic countries, it has fewer
female politicians and business executives and prominent figures than almost any other
nation in the world. Only 1.9 percent of civil servants are women.").
116. Similarly, the expert witness in Germany is often described as a "consultant" to
the court. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, WiS. L. REV. 1113, 1209 (1991) (citing
M. CAPPELLETTI & J.M. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY (1965); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835-41 (1985);
Morris Ploscowe, The Expert Witness in Criminal Cases in France, Germany and Italy, 2
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 504 (1935)).
117.

CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 306, translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC

OF KOREA 753, 753-42 to 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
118. Id. art. 306(1), translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,
753-42 to 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992) (emphasis added). Article
275 of the Code of Civil Procedure also sets forth a general "[d]uty to be [a] witness" for
non-expert witnesses. Id. art. 275, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 753, 753-39 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). Article 275(1) states:
"Except as otherwise provided, the court may examine any person as a witness." Id. art.
275(1), translatedin 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-39 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). Except for certain public officials, a witness may
refuse to testify only on grounds of self-incrimination, privilege, or trade secret. See id.
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reflects the view that individuals with special talents and abilities
to aid the judicial process should come forward and assist the
courts. The court may ensure compliance by imposing fines on
individuals who fail to testify. 119 The rule appears to be merely
precatory, however, because courts rarely seek testimony from an
individual who is unwilling to testify. In practice, the Korean
courts neither enforce the mandatory component of Article 303
nor demand testimony from an unwilling or uncooperative expert. 120 Thus, in reality, similar to U.S. Federal Rule of Evidence
706,121 expert testimony in Korea is given voluntarily.
B. Operationof the Korean Rules
The Korean approach to expert evidence under the Code of
Civil Procedure can best be understood by examining how the
rules apply in a typical case involving an expert witness. After the
filing of the initial pleadings, either party may petition the court

arts. 276-278, 285-286, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,
753-39 to 753-41 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). A witness may refuse to
testify on the ground of self-incrimination concerning "such matters as may cause prosecution or conviction or as may being disgrace to himself" or to certain persons with whom
he has association or relation. Id. art. 285, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-40 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
Thus, the Code of Civil Procedure provides what has been described as a
"maxim" in common law jurisprudence-an individual has a duty to give evidence when
able. Interestingly, this duty is not codified in the United States Code or the Federal
Rules of Evidence. It is, however, mentioned in the case law. See Davis Enters. v. United
States Envtl. Protection Agency, 877 F.2d 1181 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that an EPA employee may not be compelled to give deposition testimony as requested by a litigant).
Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr. dissented in Davis Enterprises:
Professor Wigmore was emphatic in his support for the obligation. He wrote
that society has the right to the testimony because the demand comes from "the
community as a whole-from justice as an institution and from law and order as
indispensable elements of civilized life." The particular cause before the court
may be "petty and personal, but the results that hang upon it are universal ....
The pettiness and personality of the individual trial disappear when we reflect
that our duty to bear testimony runs not to the parties in that present cause, but
the community at large and forever."
Id. at 1190 (citations omitted) (Weis, J., dissenting); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 688-89 & n.26 (1972).
119. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 282, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-40 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
120. See Suh Interview I, supra note 95.
121. See FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
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for the appointment of an expert witness. 122 Alternatively, the
court itself may deem that the case warrants an expert's analysis.123 The court may either request the parties to nominate expert
witnesses and choose one from that list, 124 or it may select another
individual altogether. 125 In cases involving frequently adjudicated
subject matters, the court may choose from a list of expert witnesses who have testified in previous actions without resorting to
the parties. 126 Thus, the court may maintain a list of real estate
appraisers for disputes over land value, 127 physicians for personal
injury actions, or university academic departments equipped to
perform scientific experiments for suits requiring academic or
technical analysis. 128 The individuals on these lists are not considered members of "panels" or "boards" of certified expert witnesses as proposed by U.S. commentators to enhance the standing
of expert witnesses. 129 A ranking district court judge directs court
personnel to maintain these lists, thus making the process informal
130
and convenient for judges.
Article 309 of the Korean Code of Civil Procedure permits a
131
party to challenge the court's appointment of an expert witness.
The grounds for a challenge are somewhat vague: "In cases where
122. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
123. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
124. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
125. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
126. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
127. In some districts, names of appraisers are stored in computer-generated lists from
which witnesses may be randomly selected. See Rhee Interview, supra note 115.
128. In addition to individual professionals, the court may request expert testimony,
usually in the form of a report, from "a public office, school or any other organization
possessed of adequate equipment." CODE OF CIv. PROC. art. 314(1), translated in 2
CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research
Inst. ed., 1992). In practice, the court requests reports from, for example, a hospital, research laboratory, or professional organization. See Suh Interview I, supra note 95.
129. See infra text accompanying note 238.
130. See Suh Interview I, supra note 95.
131. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 309, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
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there are such circumstances as preventing an expert witness from
giving expert testimony faithfully, the parties may challenge
him." 132 Litigants often challenge expert witnesses based on bias
or interest. 133 Interestingly, the Korean rules allow a party to immediately appeal the court's denial of the party's objection to the
appointment of the expert witness. 134 This availability of an immediate appeal may indicate an expert witness' special role under
Korean law and the need for a prompt opportunity to correct an
unwarranted appointment. Conversely, when a court sustains an
objection to the appointment of an expert witness, the nonobjecting party may not immediately appeal this decision. 135
After appointing an expert, the court summons the courtappointed witness to take a special oath. 136 The court then assigns
the expert witness his or her task, which varies from case to case.
The assigned task depends largely upon the individual judge, or if
the action is before a collegiate court, its ranking judge. The court
may either: (1) request the witness only to clarify or confirm certain facts; (2) instruct the expert to give his or her opinion on what
may be the ultimate issue of an action; or (3) ask the witness to do
7
both. 13

132. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 309, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
133. See Suh Interview 1,supra note 95.
134. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 310(1), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). In contrast, the court's denial of a party's motion to disqualify an expert witness is clearly not
immediately appealable in U.S. federal courts.
135. See CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 310(3), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
136. Expert witnesses take the following oath: "'I swear that I will give my opinion
faithfully in accordance with my conscience and will be subject to the penalty of false expert testimony in case of any falsehood in my opinion."' Id. art. 311, translated in 2
CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research

Inst. ed., 1992). This oath differs from the oath for all other witnesses, which reads: "I
swear that I will conscientiously speak the truth without concealing or adding anything
and will be subject to the penalty of perjury in case of false statement." Id. art. 292(2),
translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-41 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
137. See Suh Interview I, supra note 95. For example, in a negligence action arising
out of an automobile accident, the court may ask the expert witness to ascertain the speed
of each car, the weather conditions, or the lighting conditions. The court may also ask the
expert to give an opinion as to whether the crash occurred in Mr. Kim's lane or Mr.
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The court decides whether the witness may attend trial proceedings or review the evidence presented. Because the Korean
Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for general pre-trial discovery, an expert witness is not subject to depositions or any other
discovery requests. An expert witness submits a written report to
the court, which the court then distributes to the parties. The report states the witness' position and special qualifications, summarizes the task given, states the materials reviewed, and sets forth
138
analyses and conclusions.
After receiving the report, either party, as well as the court,
may request in-court examination of the expert witness. 139 Examination, however, is only by leave of court. 140 The scope of the
examination is often limited to the contents of the expert's written
report, including the analyses and conclusions. 141 The court has
great discretion in shaping the examination, but either party may
object to questions by the other litigant. 142
Former district court judges insist that the court is not obliged
to accept or adopt the expert witness' conclusions. 143 Judges are
free to reject any part of the witness' report. 144 Thus, although the
court-appointed expert witness is seen as the court's assistant and
presumed to give impartial testimony, his or her conclusions and
45
testimony do not carry an "aura of infallibility."'1
Although the court appoints only one expert witness per issue,
the parties may retain "experts" to testify in their fields of expertise without the title of "court-appointed expert witness. '146 If
there is contradictory "expert" evidence, the party-retained witChang's lane.
138. See Jeon Interview 1,supra note 39; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
139. The rules of examination of non-expert witnesses apply to expert witnesses. See
CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 305, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 753, 753-42 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992) ("The provisions of Section 2 [Examination of Witness] shall apply mutatis mutandis to expert testimony, except
in case of provisions of Article 283 [Taking in Custody of Non-appearing witness].").
140. See Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
141. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Lee Interview, supra note 95.
142. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Lee Interview, supra note 95.
143. See Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
144. See Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
145. For a discussion of the "infallibility" of expert evidence in the U.S. setting, see
Gross, supra note 116, at 1179-81.
146. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview 1,supra note 95.
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ness is presumptively partial, biased, and less objective. 147 Thus,
many litigants do not retain such witnesses. In certain cases, however, especially those involving complex facts or disputed issues on
which the community of experts is divided, parties may choose to
offer the testimony of partisan experts. 148 Occasionally, the court
may question the conclusions of its court-appointed expert witness
and seek the opinion of another expert, or alternatively, adopt the
149
testimony of a party-retained expert.
IV. KOREAN COUNTERPARTS To THE U.S. FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE PROVISIONS GOVERNING EXPERT TESTIMONY

A. FederalRule of Evidence 702
Rule 702 provides for: (1) the general subject matter of expert testimony, (2) the qualification of the expert witness, (3) the
threshold standard to permit a party to offer such testimony, and
(4) the form in which the expert may give testimony. 150 Rule 702's

147. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95.
148. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81. The prosecution arising out of the collapse of the Sungsoo Bridge
illustrates this situation. During morning rush hour on October 21, 1994, a portion of the
Sungsoo Bridge, one of fifteen bridges connecting the northern and southern parts of
Seoul, collapsed onto the waters of the Han River. As a result of the accident, 32 people
died and many more sustained serious injuries. The public was outraged. See Andrew
Pollack, A Crisis of Faitl Is the New Korea Jerry-Built?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at
A4. In response, the Prime Minister accepted moral responsibility and offered his resignation to the President of Korea. "
The Supreme Public Prosecutors Office brought criminal charges of negligent
homicide against, among others, officials of the Dong-Ah Company, which designed and
constructed the bridge. The court appointed a professor of civil engineering at Suwon
University as its expert witness.
Both sides also retained faculty members from two respected universities in Seoul
as experts. Faculty members from Seoul National University testified for the prosecution;
their counterparts from Hanyang University appeared for the defense. The prosecution's
witnesses testified that the collapse of the bridge was due primarily to faulty construction
and design. The defense's witnesses testified that inadequate work in the repair and
maintenance of the bridge was the primary cause of the collapse. The court-appointed
expert witness' findings and conclusions were closer to the testimony of the defense witnesses. See Suh Interview I, supra note 95.
149. In this and other respects, the Korean system of selecting and using expert witnesses is similar to the system in Germany. See Langbein, supra note 116, at 837-40.
150. Rule 702 provides, with the corresponding provisions in the text above indicated:
If [1] scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [3] will assist the trier
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Korean counterpart is Article 306(1) of the Korean Code of Civil
Procedure, which states that "[a]ny person who is possessed of
erudition and/or experience necessary for giving expert testimony
shall bear the obligation to give such testimony."' 151 The plain text
of Rule 702's Korean counterpart appears to address only two of
the four issues dealt with in Rule 702: the matter of qualification
of the expert witness and perhaps more obliquely, the general
subject of expert testimony. 152 In practice, however, several aspects of Rule 702 have similar application in Korea.
Rule 702 allows expert testimony in the subject areas of scientific, technical, and the all-inclusive "other specialized knowledge. ' 153 Commentators have noted that areas of knowledge on
which expert testimony will be accepted are broad. 154 Unlike the
U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence, the Korean Code of Civil Procedure does not describe the specific subject areas in which there
may be expert testimony. In practice, the areas for expert testimony are equally broad, subject to the limitation that the expert
testify only on areas in which he or she has obtained advanced
155
education or certifiable skill.
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, [21 a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, [41
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
151. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 306(1), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753,753-42 to 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
152. The Code of Civil Procedure seemingly includes an obligation to give expert testimony. See id. art. 306, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
753, 753-42 to 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992). The U.S. Federal
Rules of Evidence clearly state, however, that "[a]n expert witness shall not be appointed
by the court unless the witness consents to act." FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
153. FED. R. EVID. 702; see id. advisory committee's note ("The rule is broadly
phrased. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the
'scientific' and technical' but extend to all 'specialized' knowledge.").
The proper standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence in U.S. federal
courts is set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
In Daubert, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the test from Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which stated that "expert opinion based on a scientific
technique is inadmissible unless the technique is 'generally accepted' as reliable in the
relevant scientific community." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584. Instead, the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the Frye test. See id. at 587.
154. L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1389, 1395 (1995).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 150-153.
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Rule 702 requires that expert witnesses be qualified by
"knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. ' 156 Thus, it
allows physicians, physicists, and architects, as well as "the large
group sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses, such as bankers or
landowners testifying to land values," to give expert testimony. 157
The Korean counterpart to this qualification requirement is Article 306(1), which states that one "possessed of erudition and/or
experience necessary for giving expert testimony" qualifies as an
expert. 158 Although the two rules seem similar, they differ somewhat in application. Under Rule 702, doctors and doctorates, as
well as carpenters and car mechanics, could qualify as expert witnesses. Under Korean practice, however, it is unlikely that the latter two, regardless of their experience or degree of specialized
knowledge, would be appointed as expert witnesses. 159 Only individuals with advanced education in a particular field or professionals with special occupational licenses or certification qualify as
expert witnesses in Korea. 160 Thus, Korean standards appear to
presume that court-appointed expert witnesses hold white-collar
positions.
Rule 702 requires that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'1 61 Commentators note that the subject testimony need only be "helpful"
to the trier of fact to be admissible under Rule 702. 162 0r as John
Henry Wigmore posits, "[o]n this subject can a jury receive from
156. FED. R. EvID. 702.

157. Id. advisory committee's note.
158. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 306(1), translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-42 to 753-43 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992).
159. In Korea, such witnesses could give testimony similar to expert witnesses in U.S.
federal courts, but as regular witnesses and without the title of "court-appointed expert
witness."
160. See supra text accompanying notes 150-153.
161. FED. R. EVID. 702.

162. See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing
the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 350, 355 (1992) (citing 3 DAVID W. LOUiSELL & CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 380, at 633 (1979)); Perrin, supra note 154, at 1398.

The liberalizing rule eliminates the higher standard that the subject of the expert testimony either (1) lie outside common knowledge, see McCarthy, supra, at 355, or (2) be
"beyond the ken of the ordinary lay person," Faust F. Rossi, Modern Evidence and the
Expert Witness, LITIGATION, Fall 1985, at 18, 19.
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this person appreciable help?" 163 Many regard Rule 702 to be
more lenient than some state courts' standards. For example, New
York requires that expert evidence be "of material aid to the just
determination of the action." 164 In contrast, Korea's Article
306(1) is silent as to the standard of helpfulness; the matter is left
to the court's discretion.
Most U.S. commentators agree that it is fairly easy to meet
the standards for the qualification of expert witnesses under Rule
702.165 Comparatively, the standards for appointing an expert witness in Korea appear to be appreciably higher. This difference is
likely due to the Korean witness' role as a neutral assistant and the
expectation that he or she hold a certain profession and deliver
testimony of a skilled or analytical nature.
Finally, Rule 702 provides that an expert witness, unlike an
ordinary witness, may testify "in the form of an opinion. ' ' 166 Although not explicitly stated in the Korean Code of Civil Procedure, an expert witness may give an opinion or testimony in any
form that the court requests. 167

163. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1923, at 29
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1978).
164. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3036(2) (McKinney 1991) (emphasis added); see Irving Younger, A
PracticalApproach to the Use of Expert Testimony, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982)
("[Rule 702] opens the door quite wide to the receipt of expert testimony.").
165. See FAUST F. ROSSI, EXPERT WITNESSES 27 (1991) ("'[Dloubts about whether an
expert's testimony will be useful generally should be resolved in favor of admissibility....' (quoting 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[02], at
702-30 (1988))); Perrin, supra note 154, at 1395 ("Rule 702 is generous in its definition of
an expert."); Younger, supra note 164, at 3. One judge explained his approach to an expert witness' qualification on a given subject:
My rule of thumb test for whether or not a witness is qualified as an expert is
simple. I hear the witness explain his experience, and if there is an objection to
the qualifications I would explain to the jury that under the Federal Rules of
Evidence an expert is any person who knows more about what he is talking
about than I do.
Expert Testimony, 11 TOURO L. REV. 107, 143 (1994) (comments by Hon. George C.
Pratt).
With respect to the qualification of technical expert witnesses, see Christopher P.
Murphy, Note, Experts, Liars, and Guns for Hire: A Different Perspectiveon the Qualification of Technical Expert Witnesses, 69 IND. L.J. 637 (1994).
166. FED. R. EVID. 702.
167. See Suh Interview 1,supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
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B. FederalRule of Evidence 703

Rule 703 provides that the basis of an expert's testimony does
not need to be admissible evidence, so long as it is material that is
"reasonably relied upon by the experts."'1 68 Generally, under
common law, an expert's testimony could be based only on admissible evidence and personal knowledge. 169 The expert witness
could not rely on documents that amounted to hearsay. 170 One legal scholar believes that Rule 703's broadening of the bases of an
expert witness' testimony is well-justified:
One rationale is efficiency. Often an expert relies on records..
• that would themselves be admissible but only after the expenditure of money and time in producing and examining
authenticating witnesses. Another rationale is trustworthiness.
Rule 703 is justified because the expert is qualified to assess the
reliability of these nonevidence sources, she may therefore be
trusted to rely only on trustworthy materials, and she is present
in court to explain the nature, extent, and reasons for this reli1
ance. 17
The Advisory Committee explains that the change was "to
bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts
themselves when not in court. ' 172 Thus, under current practice,
Rule 703 allows an expert witness to rely on three sources: (1)
first-hand observation; (2) presentation at trial; and (3) presentation of outside data to the expert, so long as other experts in the
field reasonably rely on such data. 173
Rule 703 has inspired a great deal of commentary. 174 In con168. FED. R. EVID. 703 states in full:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by the experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.
169. See ROSSI, supra note 165, at 44.
170. See id. at 45-46.
171. Id. at 46.
172. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note; see McCarthy, supra note 162, at
355-56.
173. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
174. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 165, at 43-98; Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in
Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U.
FLA. L. REV. 234 (1984); McCarthy, supra note 162, at 355-58; Stanley Pierce et al., Ex-
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trast, Korean law is generally not as well-developed or sophisticated on the subject of expert evidence in both judicial thought
and academic discussion. 175 The Code of Civil Procedure is silent
as to whether an expert witness may rely on inadmissible evidence,
and there has been little, if any, academic discussion on this subject. Nevertheless, it seems that Korean practice is identical to
U.S. practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Expert witnesses may rely on data not admitted into evidence. 176 Practitioners in Korea appear to follow Rule 703's "reasonably relied
upon" requirement, although jurists prefer to describe it as a mat177
ter of "common sense."
C. FederalRule of Evidence 704
Except in criminal actions, Rule 704 provides that testimony
"embrac[ing] an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact"
may be admissible. 178 Because the jury is free to disregard the
evidence presented, Rule 704 rejects the notion that an expert testifying on an ultimate issue usurps the jury function. 179 The old
rule, which precluded testimony on the ultimate issue of an action,
has been described as "unduly restrictive, difficult [to apply], and
generally served only to deprive the trier of fact of useful informapert Testimony in Technically Complex Litigation, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 429, 433-38 (1990);

Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1987); Rossi, supra note 162, at 2123.
175. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, supra note 8, at 17 ("In nearly all branches of

law, Korea has a smaller body of case law than does the United States and most West
European countries, because litigation is a comparatively rare phenomenon in Korea.").
176. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
177. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
178. FED. R. EvID. 704 provides in full:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
179. See id. advisory committee's note. Wigmore has dismissed the notion of jury
usurpation as "empty rhetoric." 7 WIGMORE, supra note 163, § 1920, at 18; see Daniel J.
Steinbock et al., Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 41 VAND. L. REV. 261, 267
(1988).
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A Korean court may, in its discretion, request an expert witness to give an opinion on the ultimate issue in an action. Like a
U.S. jury, a Korean court is free to reject expert testimony and
may render a decision contrary to the expert's opinion. 181 One
182
former judge points out that this can occur with some frequency.
D. FederalRule of Evidence 705
Rule 705 provides that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. ' 183 A legal scholar has noted that Rule 705 permits qualified witnesses to state only that they have formed their conclusions
and then to state their conclusions, without stating anything further. 184 The rule also allows witnesses to limit their testimony to
responses to hypothetical questions. 185 To account for this scenario and to be fair to the opposing party, Rule 705 also provides
that "[t]he expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. ' 186 The opposing
party's lawyer must decide whether to conduct cross-examination
based on the results of the expert witness' deposition and other
187
discovery proceedings.
Rule 705 has no textual equivalents in Korea. In Korean
practice, expert witnesses usually submit their written reports to
the court and the parties. Their reports contain a brief curriculum
vitae, a summary of the court-assigned task, work done pursuant to
the task, findings, and conclusions. 188 A report without such information would be considered incomplete. 189 A report that states
only the witness' appointment and conclusion, without mentioning
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
See Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
See Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
FED. R. EvID. 705.
See Rossi, supra note 165, at 115-16.
See id. at 116.
FED. R. EVID. 705.
See ROSSI, supra note 165, at 116.
See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39.
See id.
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the basis of his or her testimony, is unheard of and will likely raise
a question of the witness' competence. 190 Indeed, the absence or
inadequacy of underlying facts or data is often the basis for a
party's request to examine the expert witness in court. 191 Thus,
the expert must discuss the basis of his or her conclusions in the
report because, unlike U.S. federal court practice, an expert wit192
ness in Korea is not subject to pre-trial deposition testimony.
Often, the only record of the witnesses' work is the written report.

193

E. FederalRule of Evidence 706
Rule 706 governs court-appointed experts. 194 Rule 706(a)
provides for the selection of court-appointed expert witnesses and
sets forth their duties and responsibilities. 195 This provision also
specifies that the court may select expert witnesses from among
submitted nominations or from its own candidates. 196 The court
must notify the expert witnesses about their duties and inform the
parties about the experts' findings. 197 The parties may depose, examine, and cross-examine the experts. 198 Rule 706(b) provides
that expert witnesses shall receive "reasonable compensation" as
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id.
See Suh Interview I, supra note 95.
See id.; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
See Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
For a helpful guide on the practical aspects of Rule 706, see JOE S. CECIL &

THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CrR., COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS:
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

706 (1993).
195. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) provides:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the
parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness
consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties
by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have the opportunity to participate. A witness
so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness'
deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by
the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party, including a party calling the witness.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. No individual can be compelled, however, to be an expert witness. See id.
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directed by the court. 199
With a few notable exceptions, the selection of expert witnesses in Korea and the assignment of their duties and responsibilities are virtually identical to those described under Rule 706(a)
and (b). Parties may submit nominations for the court-appointed
expert witnesses, and the court may select a witness from among
the nominees or from its own candidates. In cases involving frequently litigated subject areas, the court may refer to a list of appointed experts. 200 The court informs the witnesses of their duties
and notifies the parties of the same. 20 1 The witnesses perform
their assigned duties, conduct their activities, and submit their
findings. Although not explicitly stated in the Code of Civil Pro20 2
cedure, witnesses are compensated for their services.
There are two key differences between Korean practice and
U.S. practice under subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 706. First, the
Korean expert witness is not subject to deposition because such
discovery is not permissible. Second, unless otherwise directed by
the court, the witness is not required to provide in-court testimony.
Unlike U.S. federal practice, litigants in Korea do not have a right
of examination of expert witnesses.
Whereas many of the provisions in Rule 706 (a) and (b) correspond closely with Korean practice, the contents of Rule 706 (c)
and (d) have no Korean counterparts. Rule 706(c) permits the
court to disclose to the jury that the expert witness is court-

199. FED. R. EVID. 706(b) provides:
Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable from
funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other civil
actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like
manner as other costs.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 125-130.
201. See Jeon Interview I, supra note 39; Suh Interview I, supra note 95; Yoon Interview, supra note 81.
202. Ultimately, the compensation of a court-appointed expert witness is included in
the costs of the action, which the non-prevailing party generally bears. See CODE OF CIV.
PROC. art. 89, translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 753, 753-12
(Korea Legislation Research Inst. ed., 1992) ("The costs of a suit shall be borne by the
defeated party.").
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appointed. 203 Rule 706(d) explicitly states that it does not prohibit
the parties from calling their own expert witnesses. 20 4 In Korea,
05
only the court can confer the title "expert witness. ' 2 The parties
may retain witnesses to testify in the same subject areas as courtappointed expert witnesses; however, these witnesses may testify
20 6
only as regularwitnesses.
Thus, deleting subsections (c) and (d) of Rule 706 and slightly
revising subsection (a) would proyide for a system similar to the
Korean practice.
V. TOWARD REFORM OF THE USE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE IN THE
U.S. COURTS

A large portion of the commentary on U.S. expert evidence
criticizes the current system of selecting and using expert witnesses. 207 Ideally, expert evidence should be used to "assist the
trier of fact 20 8 toward a fair determination of the facts and fair
adjudication of the disputed claims. Many observers ask, however,
whether the U.S. federal system is conducive to realizing this objective. Others ask more pointedly if the system under the current
rules "undermine[s] the truth-finding, equal access, and efficiency
goals of adjudication." 20 9 One commentator protests that expert
testimony is the weak link in the adversarial fact-finding system
'210
and is, "in fact, a disgrace.
Another commentator points out that many of the current
system's flaws stem from the traditional common law reliance on

203. FED. R. EVID* 706(c) states: "In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness."
204. FED. R. EvID. 706(d) states: "Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection."
205. See supra text accompanying note 148.
206. See supra text accompanying note 148.
207. See Gross, supra note 116; Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial
Reluctance: A Proposalto Amend Rule 706 of the FederalRules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 480 (1988); Perrin, supra note 154, at 1389; The Use and Misuse of Expert
Evidence in the Courts, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 68, 69 (edited transcript of panel

discussion at American Judicature Society's mid-year meeting,
(introduction by Kathleen Sampson); Murphy, supra note 165, at 637.
208. FED. R. EvID. 702.
209. Lee, supra note 207, at 484.
210. Gross, supra note 116, at 1116.

Mar. 6, 1993)
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the parties to produce expert guidance for the trier of fact. 211 As a
result, this system encourages parties to "shop" for experts who
will provide favorable testimony 212 and favors litigants who can afford to hire the best experts. 213 The system also does not address
situations where expert testimony fails to cover issues for which
the trier of fact expects to rely on expert witnesses. 214 Further, the
current system allows, perhaps even encourages, expert witnesses
to give diametrically opposed testimony on key issues, 215 thus
transforming the trial into a battle of the experts and ultimately
leaving the trier of fact without any guidance in resolving the issues.

2 16

The U.S. system imposes significant costs on litigants for witness preparation, which drives up litigation costs and requires resources to be diverted from other pursuits, thereby further contributing to judicial inefficiency. 217 The U.S. system also allows
211. See Lee, supra note 207, at 484-85. Others echo this point. See, e.g., Perrin, supra
note 154, at 1393, 1415.
212. See Lee, supra note 207, at 483.
213. See id. at 482. "Litigants with greater wealth than their adversaries will be more
likely to obtain persuasive expert testimony." Id. at 482-83. See Richard A. Epstein, A
New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 759 (1992).
214. See Lee, supra note 207, at 485-87. "The risk of non-production of expert evidence becomes serious in matters in which courts are dependent on expert guidance for
deciding material facts." Id. at 485.
215. See Epstein, supra note 213, at 258; Lee, supra note 207, at 488; The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence, supra note 207, at 69. Indeed, a blizzard of expert testimony may
address virtually all issues except those that the trier of fact considers relevant to the
resolution of the dispute. For an example of such an "evidentiary void" in the presentation of expert testimony, Lee highlights the murder trial of Robert E. Chambers in 1988:
To help the jury determine the existence of intent to murder the victim, one of
the parties' medical experts testified that the blood vessels in the eyes of the
victim had burst, indicating extreme force applied to her neck during strangulation. After this testimony, the jury asked the judge if an expert could testify as
to the length of the stranglehold that was necessary to burst the blood vessels.
The jury considered that fact relevant to its determination of intent. The prosecution and defense then informed the judge that neither counsel had asked its
experts this question during deposition, nor had either counsel asked experts to
look into the matter. . . [T]he judge simply informed the jury that no expert
opinion would be produced on the matter.
Lee, supra note 207, at 486 (footnote and citation omitted).
216. See id.
217. See Epstein, supra note 213, at 759; Perrin, supra note 154, at 1417-18; Lee, supra
note 207, at 484. Professor Michael Tigar reports a case in which he was involved where a
party spent $5 million to prepare an expert who was deposed for twenty-three days. See
The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence, supra note 207, at 70.
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expert witnesses to give partisan rather than objective testimony.218 Typically, U.S. expert witnesses are not accountable for
their work in court proceedings. 219 Some expert witnesses admit
that they have given testimony that they would not have submitted
220
for peer review.
221
Generally, U.S. expert witnesses are a beleaguered lot.
The criticism against them has been pointed and unrelenting:
"Experts, it is said, are seen as mercenaries, prostitutes or hired
guns, witnesses devoid of principle who sell their opinions to the
highest bidder." 222 Experts shade and overstate the certainty of
their opinions, use unreliable methodologies or rely on unproven
theories, serve as conduits of inadmissible evidence, and occa223
sionally lie to serve their clients.
One commentator, who previously served as an expert witness, relates his experience in less than judicious terms:
At the American trial bar, those of us who serve as expert witnesses are known as "saxophones." . . . The idea is that the

lawyer plays the tune, manipulating the expert as though the
expert were a musical instrument on which the lawyer sounds
the desired notes.... I have experienced the subtle pressure to
join the team-to shade one's views, to conceal doubt, to overstate nuances, to downplay weak aspects of the case that one
has been hired to bolster. Nobody likes to disappoint a patron;
and beyond this psychological pressure is the financial inducement. Money changes hands upon the rendering of expertise,

218. See Lee, supra note 207, at 483 ("They may either overtly conform their testimony to the need of the side that hired them in order to earn a higher fee, or they may
unconscionably develop a bias favoring their employers' position as a result of a natural
team-spirit mentality."); Perrin, supra note 154, at 1415.
219. See McCarthy, supra note 162, at 352.
220. See id.
221. An oft-quoted quip against expert witnesses is attributed to an attorney's closing
statement to the jury: "Gentlemen of the jury, there are three kinds of liars,-the common liar, the d--d liar, and the scientific expert." Murphy, supra note 165, at 637 &
n.1. More than a hundred years later, the criticism has not subsided. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 116, at 1135 ("The contempt of lawyers and judges for experts is famous. They
regularly describe expert witnesses as prostitutes, people who live by selling services that
should not be for sale. They speak of maintaining 'stables' of experts, beasts to be ...
harnessed at the will of their masters.").
222. Perrin, supra note 154, at 1389.
223. See id. at 1418-20.
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but the expert can run his meter only so long as his patron liti224
gator likes the tune.
Reports of "professional" expert witnesses and individuals
who noisily offer their services do not improve the image of expert
witnesses. 225 All things considered, many experts deserve the
criticism that they receive.
Some observers wonder why expert witnesses, of all the participants in the adjudication process, receive the most stinging
criticism.

22 6

"[N]ot even criminal defendants get bad mouthed

quite as much as experts do."'2 27 Despite such harsh criticism, expert witnesses are merely creatures of the lawyers who vilify
them 228 and of the judges who only passively maintain control over
2 29
their work and influence.
For as long as there have been expert witnesses in U.S. courts,
there have been calls for reform of the process of gathering and
presenting expert evidence. 230 Some proposed measures are purportedly designed to address systemic flaws; others are aimed at
specific features of the system. In effect, all reform proposals seek
to gain some control over a process that has gone awry.
The most frequently proposed reform is the use of neutral,
court-appointed expert witnesses. 231 In addition, there have been
proposals to amend the substantive rules of evidence concerning
the presentation of expert testimony. 232 Some commentators em-

224. Langbein, supra note 116, at 835.
225. See Lee, supra note 207, at 483.
226. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1114, 1135; The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence,
supra note 207, at 76. Professor Gross ponders: "[I]sn't it remarkable-isn't it, in fact,
shocking-that casual observers and even interested partisans are treated by the legal
profession with at least reasonable respect, but trained and experienced doctors, engineers and scientists are castigated?" Gross, supra note 116, at 1114.
227. The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence, supra note 207, at 76.
228. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1115.
229. See Lee, supra note 207, at 480.
230. See Perrin, supra note 154, at 1440. For a sampling of the proposed reforms, see
Epstein, supra note 213; Gross, supra note 207; Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (1986); Lee, supra note 207.
231. See infra text accompanying notes 246-262.
232. For the text of proposed revisions to Rule 702 submitted in 1991, see Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
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phasize the need for the accountability of expert witnesses
through, inter alia, peer review. 233 In one state, court rules limit
the number of expert witnesses and the length of their depositions. 234 One commentator's proposed reform includes "a call to
lawyers to take the higher ground by ending the misuse and abuse
'235
of experts.
There has been some experimentation with expert witness
panels 236 and discussion of rule changes, 237 but reforms have been
slow, and the system appears reluctant to change. Others question
whether the proposals would do more harm than good. 238 As a resuit, the system continues on with all its flaws and remains a much
criticized part of the litigation process in the United States.
The frequent calls for reform of the present use of expert testimony highlight the utility of a comparative study of the rules and
practices relating to expert evidence in the jurisdictions of Korea
and the United States. First, comparing the differences between
the Korean and U.S. systems provides a tool for better understanding the rationale behind the rules of each jurisdiction. In addition,
studying another jurisdiction's methods allows for consideration of
other reform options, because one judicial system can draw from
the experiences of another. Indeed, some of the reforms proposed
702[1] (1991), reprintedin Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is
Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 636 (1991).
233. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1213-15.
234. See The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence, supra note 207, at 70. Such rules
were adopted in Arizona. Justice Thomas A. Zlaket of the Arizona Supreme Court explained: "[U]nder the rules that went into effect in Arizona July 1, 1992, each side is allowed one expert; one expert per issue, per side, period. Each deposition is limited to
four hours. That's all. If you can't take a deposition in four hours, you ought to find another line of work." Id.
235. Perrin, supra note 154, at 1394. This commentator explains that "[s]hort of radically changing the adversary system, the only way to reform the use of experts is for lawyers to fundamentally change their ways." Id. at 1442.
236. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1192-93.
237. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It
Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 636 (1991); Lee, supra note 207.
238. Weinstein, supra note 237, at 491-92 ("When all else fails-when neither improved pretrial procedures nor strengthened ethical codes succeed in terminating litigation in which one party's position is grounded solely on specious expert testimony-it may
be the task of the judge to do what the adversarial process and professional ethics have
failed to do. This is strong medicine. It impinges on our constitutional notion of the right
to a jury trial. And ... I share the concern with placing more power and discretion in the
'unlearned' court.").
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for the U.S. system regarding the use of expert evidence already
exist in Korean courts.
A. Proposalsfor Reform
Professor Samuel Gross is the author of perhaps the single
most comprehensive and concise work on the subject of expert
evidence in U.S. courts. 239 He discusses the need for fundamental
reforms in the expert evidence process and the relative merits of
different proposals. Professor Gross acknowledges that some of
the proposed measures require major changes in adversarial procedures. If implemented, these proposals would "challenge the
basic premises of our adversarial method. '240 Nevertheless, serious attempts to reform the current system require consideration of
all options. Specifically, Professor Gross' proposals include: (1)
using neutral court-appointed experts, either exclusively or in ad242
dition to those retained by the parties;241 (2) eliminating juries;
and (3) presenting expert testimony primarily by written re3
ports. 24
1. Court-Appointed Experts
The idea of employing a panel of qualified experts has been
discussed for almost a century. From such a panel of experts, the
court would appoint a witness to assist the trier of fact on disputed
issues.244 The "most appealing solution to the problem of partisan
expert evidence is still the oldest: use court-appointed experts. ' 245

239. See Gross, supra note 116. Critical in Professor Gross' discussion is his view that
expert evidence is inherently different from other evidence, and thus should be treated
differently. He argues: "[E]xpert information is categorically different from other types
of information that we use in litigation, and...the function of experts are fundamentally
different from those of other people who provide information in court." Id. at 1208.
240. Id. at 1210.
241. See id. at 1220-30.
242. See id. at 1218-19.
243. See id. at 1215-18. The professor's other proposals, which would require only minor changes in the procedural rules, include: (1) "chang[ing] the conventional sequence
of presentation of testimony so that the expert evidence on any issue would all be presented at one time," id. at 1211; and (2) generally increasing the accountability of expert
witnesses, see id. at 1213-15; see also Weinstein, supra note 237, at 485-86.
244. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1188-89.
245. Id. at 1220.
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The advantages of using a neutral court-appointed expert are obvious. Expert testimony would no longer be a product of the parties. Instead, the court would select its own expert, thereby
avoiding much of the current system's partisanship. Courtappointed experts can address gaps that partisan experts' testimony often creates. 246 Court-appointed experts are also "less susceptible to pressures to tailor their testimony to support a particular legal outcome than are partisan experts whose fees are
paid. "247

Although courts may appoint expert witnesses, 248 as authorized by Rule 706(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 249 they
rarely exercise this power.250 Commentators have long criticized
the unused power of federal judges to call their own expert wit-.
nesses. 251 Nevertheless, the power to appoint such experts still
goes largely unused.
Some observers reason that no expert witness can be truly
neutral, and thus, no expert witness can give truly neutral testimony.Z52

Others argue that the current system is insufficiently

246. See Lee, supra note 207, at 492.
247. Id. at 492.
248. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note.
249. FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
250. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1190. Professor Gross cites two studies conducted
by the Federal Judicial Center:
The first study included a survey of all published federal opinions through 1985;
it found only forty-five references to Rule 706, and only thirty-seven cases "in
which an appointment was made or discussed extensively." The second study
was a survey of 79% (417/526) of all active federal district court judges. Eightyone percent of the judges said that they had never appointed an expert witness
under rule 706, and only 8% said that they had done so more than once.
Id. at 1191 (footnotes and citations omitted).
251. See John M. Sink, The Unused Power of a FederalJudge to Call His Own Expert
Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956).
[I]t would seem that if the federal judiciary understands that it need not be indifferent in order to remain disinterested, their inherent power to appoint expert
witnesses in civil actions offers great potential benefit to the orderly administration of justice. There is no reason to fear the exercise of that power or to doubt
that it can be employed within the bounds of the proper and established scope of
the judiciary. Its exercise can hardly help but fulfill its reason for existingfacilitate the functioning of the court.
Id. at 214.
252. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1193; 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 17, at 72
(John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). Gross responds that this argument is
"unpersuasive." Gross, supra note 116, at 1194.
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structured to encourage or facilitate the use of expert witnesses. 253
Further, many judges and lawyers oppose the use of court254
appointed expert witnesses.
Judicial reluctance arises from concerns with potentially interfering with or influencing jury deliberation. Judges fear interfering
with the traditional functions of adversarial counsel or creating a
risk of reversal on appeal. 255 There is also an "unwillingness to
devote the time and money necessary for selecting experts and
'256
overseeing the taking of testimony.
Practitioners oppose the use of court-appointed experts because they would then lose control over experts. 257 Courtappointed experts detract from the trial lawyer's packaged presentation in seeking answers from witnesses during direct and crossexaminations and in shaping witnesses' testimony. 258 Professor
Gross contends "[i]n short, court-appointed experts are not used in
[U.S.] trials because they are beyond the control of lawyers. As a
result, they threaten the prerogatives of the trial attorneys, and
they are likely to be inadequately prepared for testimony and uncomfortably unpredictable. ' 259 Regardless of the cause, Professor
Gross notes that the use of expert witnesses in litigation has "failed
repeatedly." 260
2. Written Testimony
The usual practice of presenting expert evidence as oral testimony may be "one of the main difficulties" of expert evidence.
253. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1191; Lee, supra note 207, at 481.
254. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1197-99, 1203-04; Lee, supra note 207, at 480, 49599.
255. See Lee, supra note 207, at 480; Gross, supra note 116, at 1193.
256. Lee, supra note 207, at 480; see id. at 495-96. Lee is rather critical of the failure
on the part of the bench:
The duty of noninvolvement becomes for judges an excuse for not doing their
homework and for allocating their time to other judicial tasks that appear more
pressing. This unwillingness might also be described as a product of bureaucratic mentality-in a bureaucracy it is always safe to do nothing than to stick
your neck out.
Id. at 499 (footnote and citation omitted).
257. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1205.
258. See id. at 1201.
259. Id. at 1205.
260. Id.at 1117.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

628

[Vol. 19:585

Professor Gross explains that "[t]his format [oral expert testimony]
multiplies the cost of the process, maximizes the need for adversarial preparation and the distortions it generates, creates a market
for expert witnesses with testimonial experience and persuasive
demeanor, introduces numerous opportunities for manipulation,
'261
and scares off many useful experts.
The oral presentation of expert evidence also "limits the possibilities for reform. ' 262 Professor Gross insists that moving toward the regular use of neutral experts or creating "an external
mechanism for reviewing expert evidence" would be greatly facilitated if "instead of undergoing the ordeal of direct and crossexamination in depositions and at trial, experts expressed their
opinions in written reports. '263 He suggests a system where experts must submit written reports before trial, and where the court
permits the opposing lawyers and experts to question experts' reports. 264 Another version of this proposal would make oral testimony optional. 265
Professor Gross acknowledges two major difficulties in using
written reports. First, these reports are hearsay and would not be
admissible under any exceptions to the hearsay rule. 266 Second,
written reports deprive parties of the opportunity to cross-examine
the experts, which is "the major method of testing the value of all
evidence. '267 Gross suggests that new legislation would have to be
enacted to create an admissibility exception for expert witnesses'
written reports. 268 Gross also recognizes that the implementation
of his proposal would eliminate cross-examination of expert wit269
nesses altogether.
3. Elimination of Juries
Professor Gross states that "[tIhe institution of trial by jury is
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 1215.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1217.
See id. at 1216.
Id.
See id.
See id.

1997]

Expert Evidence: Korea v. United States

629

a serious obstacle to reform in the use of expert evidence. '270 He
notes that "the difficulty is that the rigid procedural requirements
of jury trials inhibit innovation" and that the problem could theoretically be eliminated. 271 One option is to submit expert issues to
judges instead of juries. 272 Precluding juries from considering ex273
pert evidence or eliminating juries altogether are extreme steps.
There is a constitutional right to trial by jury, 274 and an amendment to address issues relating to expert evidence is unlikely to occur soon.
The use of neutral experts who submit written reports to a
judicial officer without a jury is already implemented in some administrative proceedings. 275 Professor Gross acknowledges that
although the use of court-appointed experts has "failed repeatedly
in formal litigation," it works "reasonably well" in some administrative proceedings, such as workers' compensation cases. 276
Gross attributes the success to the following factors: "First, there
are no juries. All claims are decided by administrative law judges.
...Second [the proceedings are less formal] ....Third, and most
.important, neutral experts in workers' compensation cases do not,
as a rule, testify; they write reports. '277
B. The Korean Model
In brief, the reform of the U.S. system regarding expert evidence could benefit from a study of another jurisdiction's practice
involving expert evidence. Because the Korean judiciary has already adopted some of the reforms proposed for the U.S. system,

270. Id. at 1218.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 1219.
273. See id. at 1210.
274. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examine in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
275. See Gross, supra note 116, at 1205.
276. Id. at 1117; see id. at 1205-07.
277. Id. at 1206. Although it is difficult to assess whether court proceedings in Korea
are more or less formal than those in the States, proceedings in the civil law system are
similar to some American administrative proceedings in that there are no juries, the expert testimony is presented in writing, and testimony is given at the court's discretion.
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there is a practical utility in examining the Korean model.
As previously stated, the use of expert evidence in Korea differs significantly from its use in U.S. federal courts. Without a jury
system, the Korean court ascertains the facts and has broad discretion to shape expert testimony. The process is not left to the
parties. The court appoints an expert, thus excluding others. The
court considers this appointed expert as its assistant. Although the
court-appointed expert witness is not granted an "aura of infallibility," as the court may reject his or her findings and conclusions, the
testimony of a court-appointed witness is generally regarded more
highly than the testimony of a party-retained witness who is presumed to be biased and partial. This system reduces instances of
experts clashing on issues and enhances the standing of expert witnesses. Finally, expert testimony is largely presented in writing,
usually in a report setting forth the expert's findings, analysis, and
conclusions. Any examination of the witness is subject to the discretion of the court.
This Article does not propose converting the entire U.S.
common law system to the Korean civil law system. Admittedly,
the implementation of many of the proposed reforms may have
that effect. After considering all options, including a review of another jurisdiction's handling of expert evidence, this Article instead proposes a genuine attempt toward reforming a beleaguered
institution. A constitutional amendment eliminating the jury system solely to reform expert evidence is drastic. The use of written
reports is less radical but nonetheless requires new legislation and
eliminates a key aspect of the U.S. adjudication process. The only
feasible remaining option is the increased use of court-appointed
experts. Commentaries have already proposed revising the current rules to specify areas in which expert evidence could or should
be used and have addressed the concerns of judicial interference or
influence. 278 Regardless of whether new rules will be promulgated
278. See Lee, supra note 207, at 499-501. Lee proposes an addition to the current Rule
706(c) that would address judicial interference and influence, and a new Rule 706(e),
which would specify situations in which the court appointment of expert witnesses is mandatory. Thus, Lee's revised rules would read as follows:
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court
may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the ex-
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to increase the use of court-appointed experts, there is no reason
to avoid their use in actions without juries. Experimenting with
the use of court-appointed experts in bench trials should provide
revealing results. In any event, continued refusal to experiment
will leave a much criticized system intact.
VI. CONCLUSION

The legal systems of the Republic of Korea and the United
States reflect their separate histories as imperial colonies. Korea's
civil law system is a modified version of the system that Japan established during the first half of the twentieth century. Similarly,
the U.S. legal system, formalized under a constitution that is in its
third century, has its roots in English common law. The Korean
and U.S. legal systems have both similarities and differences. For
example, although the adjudication process in both jurisdictions is
adversarial, the two systems differ in their methods of collecting
and presenting evidence. In Korea, the court, as both trier of fact
and arbiter, ascertains the relevant facts. In the United States, the
parties are responsible for gathering and presenting evidence
through discovery and examination of witnesses.
The substance of the expert witness' testimony in Korea is
quite similar to its U.S. counterpart. There are, however, noticeable differences in the form of collection and presentation of expert evidence. Because a Korean court is authorized to investigate
the facts, it may appoint expert witnesses of its own choosing. The
judge further shapes the expert's contribution to the adjudication
of the case.
The Korean system seeks to use expert evidence to assist the
pert witness. Upon disclosure that it appointed the expert witness, the court has
a duty to instruct the jury that the jury is to make the final decision on issues of
fact and is not bound to accept as true the testimony of the expert solely because
the court selected him or her, but rather, the jury is to judge the testimony according to the same standard as the testimony of the other expert witnesses.
(e) When Not Discretionary. Courts have an affirmative duty to appoint
their own expert witnesses when the fact-finding process will otherwise be severely impaired. Such situations include those in which partisan expertise fails
to produce highly relevant evidence; in which partisan expertise conflicts on a
material fact, leaving a lack of guidance for the jury determination; or in which
the production of partisan expert testimony is abused.
Id. at 501-02 n.69.
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trier of fact. The system appears free from the sharp criticisms*
made about expert witnesses in the United States. Perhaps the
much maligned U.S. system could benefit from a study of the Korean system.

